LUCK AND TAX POLICY by Mazur, Mark J.
Ohio Northern University Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 1 Article 5
LUCK AND TAX POLICY
Mark J. Mazur
Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@ONU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Ohio Northern University Law
Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@ONU. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@onu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mazur, Mark J. () "LUCK AND TAX POLICY," Ohio Northern University Law Review: Vol. 44 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol44/iss1/5
 103 
Ohio Northern University 
Law Review 
Woodworth Memorial Lecture 
Luck and Tax Policy 
MARK J. MAZUR 
Good afternoon! 
Thank you so much for coming here today.  Special thanks to Professor 
Lobenhofer and Dean Crago of the Ohio Northern University Pettit College 
of Law for hosting this year’s Larry Woodworth lecture.  I am incredibly 
honored to have been asked to speak at this annual event, and I am humbled 
to join the ranks of those who have spoken as part of this lecture series. 
I attended the first Woodworth lecture in 1995, where Professor 
Michael Graetz spoke on income tax.  I have also attended many of these 
lectures over the last twenty years, and found them all to be interesting, 
enlightening, and, at times, provocative.  So, I have my work cut out for me 
today. 
I have a strong affinity for Larry Woodworth, though I never got to 
meet him in person.  When I served as an economist on the staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation, there were many stories about Larry’s time as 
Chief of Staff—how he worked with Members of Congress and their staffs, 
his ideas for a well-functioning tax system, and how he consistently worked 
to achieve those ideals. 
When I was at the Treasury Department in the Office of Tax Policy, 
every day Larry Woodworth looked down at me from the wall of pictures of 
previous Assistant Secretaries, starting with Stanley Surrey.  If pictures 
could talk, I imagine the advice I would get from Larry Woodworth would 
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go something like: “help ensure the tax system is fair and that it works well 
for the American public.”  That is what I have tried to do. 
My topic today is the role of luck in tax policy and I will address this 
topic in three distinct ways. The first way is somewhat introspective and 
involves thinking about how I ended up working in the field of tax policy, 
noting that life takes many twists and turns.  Many of the decisions I faced 
were characterized by large amounts of uncertainty, and I made these 
decisions with only vague notions of the ultimate consequences.  Many 
times, seemingly random or serendipitous events occurred that led me in 
new and different directions or opened new opportunities that had been 
unknown or unavailable beforehand.  I suspect that many in this room have 
had similar experiences. 
The second way focuses on the tax legislative process and the notion 
that successful enactment of legislation is seldom guaranteed.  Again, 
fortuitous circumstances help shape opportunities, and decisions often are 
made under conditions of uncertainty.  In this environment, the true 
outcomes may be in doubt right up until the legislation passes, and the 
ultimate effects of the legislation may not be known until many years later. 
The third way focuses on the design of tax systems, looking at how tax 
policy choices can take into account the myriad ways that uncertainty 
underlies economic outcomes, and hence, incomes and tax liabilities.  In 
designing a tax system, policymakers should incorporate these basic 
uncertainties into the process to more realistically accommodate the 
workings of the economic system and to predict the likely outcomes. 
With that brief introduction, let me start with the first part: a bit of 
introspection on how I wound up doing tax policy work and how unlikely it 
seems to me that I ended up on this particular career path and in a position 
to be speaking with all of you today. 
First, we probably all can think back to when we were kids and what we 
thought we would be doing as a career when we were older.  My friends and 
I had a bunch of these dreams—astronaut, teacher, athlete, doctor, truck 
driver, cook, carpenter, and so on.  But not one of us thought when we were 
ten or twelve years old that we would wind up doing tax policy for a living.  
That just did not seem to be in the set of possibilities.  As I think back upon 
my own career journey, I am amazed at what a crooked path it took. 
One of my first memories involving career choices came when I was 
around twelve years old and living in central New Jersey.  I was good in 
elementary school math, and some teachers took to giving me extra problem 
sets and recommending books that I should check out of the library.  But my 
uncle had a different idea.  He recognized that a person who was good with 
numbers could have many career paths, and he became convinced that I 
should be a bookmaker, taking bets from the working class in Jersey City, 
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New Jersey on sporting events, horse racing, and the daily number (this was 
before off-track betting and state-run lotteries became a reality). 
I remember pondering this possibility for a while, but was eventually 
dissuaded by tales indicating that a life in organized crime was dangerous 
and not all that glamorous.  So, I did not actively pursue my uncle’s 
suggestion, but clearly this was a decision made under considerable 
uncertainty, having only the barest understanding of the future 
consequences. 
Other career paths presented themselves: becoming a public-school 
math teacher like some early role models, becoming an accountant like 
another uncle, or working on the docks like some relatives.  Over the years, 
hundreds of decisions made under uncertainty tipped the scales one way or 
another. 
I left New Jersey to go to Michigan State University to study finance, 
which seemed close enough to accounting that I could see a career path in a 
profession similar to my uncle, the accountant.  I enjoyed my time at 
Michigan State, got a really good education, and in my senior year, I 
applied for a wide range of jobs.  The top two choices I had at the end of the 
process included a job that focused on making loans to businesses at the 
Small Business Administration, and a job at General Motors (GM) as an 
entry level tax accountant.  The position at GM paid about $5,000 more per 
year (which was a huge differential at that time), so I moved to Detroit and 
began to work in tax compliance.  Again, this was a choice made under 
considerable uncertainty, with uncertain future implications. 
After a couple years at GM, I got the urge to get an MBA degree and 
shift to a true finance position in a firm or a bank.  I took the GMAT exam 
and applied to Stanford University, largely because they had a well-known 
program and because the campus was in California.  Again, this was a 
decision under uncertainty.  Stanford Graduate School of Business wrote 
back, invited me to apply to the Ph.D. program in business, and then 
accepted me.  So, I went to Stanford and entered into a mathematical 
economics program which was mislabeled “Business, Economics, and 
Public Policy.”  So, my career path took a turn toward theoretical 
economics, focusing on game theory and decision-making models. 
In my second year of graduate school, I agreed to serve as a Research 
Assistant for Charles Schultze, who was from the Brookings Institution and 
was visiting Stanford for a year.  The next year, he recommended me as a 
Research Assistant to Joe Pechman, who was an acknowledged expert on 
taxation from Brookings, and who also was spending a year at Stanford.  
Joe Pechman rekindled my interest in taxes.  By then it was becoming clear 
that it was a series of random events and decisions made under uncertainty 
that got me to that place. 
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After finishing my dissertation, I became an Assistant Professor at 
Carnegie Mellon University, in the School of Urban and Public Affairs.  
One of my colleagues there, Bob Strauss, thought I should spend some time 
working at the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation, as he had done 
several years prior.  He arranged an interview for me with the Joint 
Committee on Taxation staff and I wound up taking a leave of absence to 
work on tax policy for a Congressional Committee.  But it was fortuitous 
that I wound up teaching at a school where one of my colleagues acted as a 
facilitator with the staff at the Joint Committee on Taxation. 
That is how I got to start serious work on tax policy issues.  However, I 
did take another detour to work on energy issues with a particular emphasis 
on climate change.  Late in the Clinton Administration, I was working at the 
Department of Energy as head of the Energy Information Administration 
when I got a call from a head hunter who was looking for someone to lead 
the research operations at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to serve 
under then-Commissioner Rossotti.  Truthfully, I had little interest in 
working at the IRS, but several of my students from Carnegie Mellon had 
gone to work for American Management Systems, which was headed by 
Charles Rossotti, and they raved about him.  So, I figured an interview with 
Commissioner Rossotti would at least be interesting and I applied for the 
position.  After meeting with Commissioner Rossotti, we both thought the 
position would be a good fit, and I became the Director of Research, 
Analysis, and Statistics at the IRS—or what I playfully called the IRS’s 
“egghead division.”  From that point on, I was well on my way to a career 
path in tax, but again, it was a series of random events and decisions under 
uncertainty that got me to shift onto this career path. 
The bottom line is that there were perhaps hundreds of decisions I made 
along the way that pushed me in some direction or another, and many of 
these decisions were made under conditions of uncertainty, where the 
consequences could not be determined with any degree of clarity.  Many 
times throughout my life, random events and specific individuals with 
outsized influence, helped push me onto the tax policy career path in ways 
that can only be described as fortuitous.  In all these ways, luck has played a 
key role in getting me to work in tax policy and to be able to help shape tax 
policy, hopefully for the better. 
Introspection makes clear to me that luck was a key factor in having me 
wind up working in the area of tax policy and in shaping my career path.  
And, I am sure that luck played a similar role in many of the career journeys 
of those in this room, for seldom does one’s life follow a straight line.  More 
likely, it is a path characterized by twists and turns which are affected to a 
large extent by fortune or luck. 
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Now, I would like to turn to the second topic for the evening: the role of 
luck, fortune, or serendipity in the enactment of tax legislation.  
Successfully enacted legislation needs three components: 
1) Recognition of a problem; 
2) Identification of potential solutions – this can be an iterative 
process; it also can proceed ahead of identifying specific problems 
or legislative vehicles, in the sense that this step can be simply 
anticipating the types of problems to be encountered in the future 
and coming up with a range of possible solutions that can be 
deployed if necessary; and 
3) Development of political coalitions to support one of the 
identified solutions. 
These components all need to be completed in reasonable proximity in 
time to one another or there is little chance that legislation can be 
successfully enacted. 
And while the legislation when enacted may be characterized by 
supporters as reform, it may not always share the classic properties of true 
reform.  In tax, those properties would be embodied in legislation that 
makes the tax system more efficient, more equitable, simpler, or ideally, 
some combination of the three.  Sometimes, steps intended to result in basic 
reform may have unintended consequences and perhaps move the tax 
system in the wrong direction.  This can be especially true when viewed 
after the passage of time. 
For example, in January 1969, Treasury Secretary Joseph Barr informed 
Congress that 155 high income taxpayers (defined as those with income of 
at least $200,000) paid no individual income tax.1  The public and Congress 
were outraged and Congress responded by creating legislation to address 
this situation.2  Treasury and congressional staff developed possible ways to 
address this outrageous issue, and Congress responded by creating an add-
on alternative tax that took certain tax preferences (such as lower-taxed 
capital gains income), and applied a specific tax rate to these preferences.3  
This new tax on preference items was added to regular income tax liability 
in order to move the 155 zero-tax taxpayers (and other similarly-situated 
 
 1. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS 
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 14 (1987). 
 2. See id. (noting that the disclosure prompted a mass amount of indignant mail to members of 
Congress). 
 3. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 487, 580-86. 
5
Mazur: LUCK AND TAX POLICY
Published by DigitalCommons@ONU,
108 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
 
lightly taxed high income individuals) into a position where they paid a 
significant amount of income tax each year.4 
This legislation had all three components: 
1) The problem recognized by Secretary Barr; 
2) A potential solution identified based on some of the causes of 
low or zero effective tax rates on high-income individuals (e.g., 
low-taxed capital gains income, very large itemized deductions 
relative to adjusted gross income, and certain business expenses in 
excess of economic cost); and 
3) Development of a political coalition of members of Congress 
who bargained over the details of the legislation so that a working 
majority saw fit to include this in the Tax Reform Act of 1969.5 
The resulting compromise was modified in the 1970s.6  When the 2001 
and 2003 tax cuts were enacted, ordinary income tax rates were reduced 
substantially and more preferential tax rates were introduced for long-term 
capital gains and qualified dividend income.7  As a result, the number of 
alternative minimum tax (AMT) taxpayers increased dramatically.8  The 
upshot is that many taxpayers in the $200,000-$500,000 annual income 
range are subject to today’s AMT because they have some combination of 
state and local taxes, personal exemptions, miscellaneous business 
expenses, and tax-preferred capital gains income.  Of the 5 million or so 
current AMT taxpayers, a majority are in the $200,000-$500,000 annual 
income range.  And while the AMT still ensures that over 100,000 
taxpayers with incomes over $1 million per year pay additional income tax, 
it has become a very imperfect tool for the policy job Secretary Barr and the 
Congress set out to address. 
The point of this anecdote is that while there was a fortuitous set of 
circumstances leading up to the enactment of what would become the AMT, 
the results from the distance of a few decades indicate that it was not the 
successful type of tax reform that was intended. 
 
 4. See Richard D. Hobbet, Transitional Mechanisms to Facilitate Tax Reform, 35 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 818, 831 (1969). 
 5. See id. at 835-37 (discussing the legislative history underlying the Tax Reform Act of 1969). 
 6. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 1, at 14-15. 
 7. Jason Debacker et al., Rising Inequality: Transitory or Persistent? New Evidence from a 
Panel of U.S. Tax Returns, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 67, 107 (Spring 2013). 
 8. See Lori Montgomery, Alternative Minimum Tax Targeted, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/10/AR2006111001800.html (noting 
that there was nearly an increase of 100,000 families paying the tax in 2006 compared to 2003). 
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A second example is the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  Last year was the 
30th anniversary of its passage and many articles and reviews were written 
describing its path to passage and the economic and tax policy 
consequences of its enactment.  But, the definitive account of the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act to my mind remains Showdown at Gucci Gulch.9  The book 
details the ups and downs of the tax reform process and illustrates the three 
prerequisites I mentioned earlier for tax reform to be enacted. 
Observers had pointed out many problems with the Tax Code in the 
mid-1980s.  Statutory rates seemed high, especially compared to amounts 
collected, meaning that effective tax rates were quite a bit lower than the 
statutory marginal rate schedule.  This was indicative of a proliferation of 
special deductions and exclusions that had been put into the Tax Code over 
many years.  Moreover, a whole tax shelter industry had arisen and 
flourished, luring high income people to invest in non-economic projects 
that promised large after-tax returns.  The existence of this industry 
weakened the integrity of the tax system in the eyes of the public.  Since the 
vast majority of taxpayers did their tax returns each year by hand, taxpayers 
felt that the Tax Code had gotten too complex for ordinary Americans. 
Faced with these perceived problems, many policy makers and outside 
observers developed their own potential solutions.  The Treasury 
Department developed a coherent and consistent framework for reform.10  
Senators found common ground on proposals that removed special tax 
benefits (broadened the tax base) and used the resultant revenue to 
substantially lower tax rates.11  Congressional and Administration staff 
hammered out approaches that were roughly consistent with notions of 
horizontal and vertical equity, containing dozens of provisions that, taken 
together, led to rough revenue neutrality (over the three-year budget 
window in use at the time).12  These efforts defined the multi-dimensional 
space of feasible reform options. 
Then it was up to the master legislators in Congress and the Reagan 
Administration strategists to push, prod, cajole, and make the necessary 
tradeoffs so that a bipartisan majority would approve the bill.  There were 
many times this process could have faltered, but in each case, there was a 
fateful discussion, an unexploited political trade, or an outside push from an 
unlikely source in the business or public policy community to get things 
 
 9. See generally BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 1 (extensively detailing the nuances of tax 
the tax reform process). 
 10. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1984). 
 11. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 1, at 5. 
 12. Id. at 17. 
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back on track.13  Clearly, fortune shone on the fate of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 over and over again as it avoided a series of perils and followed an 
unsteady path toward enactment.  This is not to say that hard work, 
creativity, and determination did not play a major role in the enactment of 
this landmark bill, but rather to acknowledge that all the stars lined up for 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  Luck is one component that helped propel it 
toward enactment, where it stands as the tax policy accomplishment of a 
generation. 
At various times since 1986, it has appeared that another major tax 
reform plan was at hand, only to have those hopes dashed time and time 
again.  The most recent instance was the 2012 to 2014 period.  Virtually all 
observers agreed that the United States business tax system no longer 
worked well in a globalized economy where large amounts of revenue 
generated by firms were premised on the existence of valuable intellectual 
property.  All agreed on the salient fact that, while the United States may 
have been a low corporate income tax country after the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act became law, the intervening decades saw every other country reduce 
corporate income tax rates to the point where the United States was 
perceived as a “high tax” country.  This perception was based on the 
maximum statutory tax rate, even though effective or average tax rates for 
United States-based multinationals tended to be significantly lower.  So, the 
problems were recognized. 
As part of the “identifying solutions” component, the Obama 
Administration released the President’s Framework for Business Tax 
Reform in February 2012, and provided additional detail in subsequent 
annual budget submissions.14  Chairman Camp released his detailed tax 
reform plan a little later, after extensive consultations with members of 
Congress, business representatives, and others in the tax policy 
community.15  Both approaches would have modernized the United States 
business-tax system, broadened the tax base, and brought down the 
maximum statutory tax rate.16  In this sense, the business components of the 
tax reform plans were broadly similar, describing a hybrid tax system for 
multinational firms, partway between a pure territorial tax system and the 
 
 13. See id. (summarizing that Congress, Reagan, and the Finance Committee could all stop the 
tax reform). 
 14. See THE WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR 
BUSINESS TAX REFORM (Feb. 2012). 
 15. See COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, Tax Reform Act of 2014: DISCUSSION DRAFT SECTION-
BY-SECTION SUMMARY (2014); see also Dave Camp, Woodworth Memorial Lecture: Prospects for Tax 
Reform: We Need it Now, 42 OHIO. N.U. L. REV. 517 (2016). 
 16. See THE WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 14; see also COMM. ON 
WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 15. 
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existing United States system of worldwide taxation with deferral.17  The 
similarities also included a tax rate significantly below the current thirty-
five percent rate and numerous base-broadening measures to help pay for 
the overall reform package.18 
But unlike 1986, luck was not with Chairman Camp and the political 
stars did not align.19  No amount of political maneuvering could put together 
a majority coalition that could agree on a particular legislative path.  So, this 
reform effort was abandoned in large part due to the bad fortune of being 
surfaced during a very difficult political time period.  Given the political 
situation, there was no way to pull together a reliable bipartisan coalition to 
agree on the difficult tradeoffs necessary to enact tax reform. 
What does this mean for our present situation?  The problem of a 
suboptimal business tax system still exists and there is widespread 
agreement that it needs to be modified and updated.  Several possible 
solutions have been identified.  Now the difficult work of crafting political 
coalitions has begun.  It is still too early to tell if a majority coalition can get 
behind one or another of the possible solutions, or whether one of these 
solutions will lead to true tax reform where the resulting system is more 
efficient, fair, and/or simple than the current one.  One thing I truly believe, 
is that it will take a significant amount of good luck or good fortune for 
Congress to enact true tax reform in the next year or so.  
Now, let me turn to the third focus of my talk today: the way that a 
recognition of the effects of luck can feed into the design of tax policy.  Let 
us start by considering how incomes are determined.  A simple model might 
say that an individual’s income is a function of three components: 
 
 Skills possessed by an individual that are valued in the market – 
more skills or a higher level of skill tends to be associated with 
higher income, all else equal; 
 The level of effort expended by the individual – more effort 
expended by the individual tends to be associated with higher 
incomes, all else equal; and 
 A random component that can lead to higher incomes (if the 
individual is lucky) or lower income (if unlucky).20  
 17. See THE WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 14; see also COMM. ON 
WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 15. 
 18. See THE WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 14; see also COMM. ON 
WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 15. 
 19. See Danny Vinik, Paul Ryan Just Made Tax Reform Harder, NEW REPUBLIC (April 1, 2014), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/117223/paul-ryans-2015-budget-sets-impossible-goals-tax-reform 
(noting the failure of Chairman Camp’s plan). 
 20. See Debacker et al., supra note 7, at 128; see also Hal R. Varian, Redistributive Taxation as 
Social Insurance, 14 J. PUB. ECON.49, 49-50 (1980). 
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In a simple model, one can think of these three components being 
multiplied together (though more complicated, functional forms can be 
introduced).  If the random variable has an expected value of one, then in 
the simple model (where the three components are multiplied) an 
individual’s income, on average, will reflect their innate skills and their 
level of effort.  (It might help one’s intuition to think of skills being 
measured by an expected hourly wage or salary and the effort expended 
equal to hours worked; the random variable would then generate either 
higher wages (for lucky individuals) or lower wages (for the unlucky).) 
Income as actually observed in this model would have the luck 
component already built in when income is observed, and it would not be 
possible for the tax authority to disentangle all the effects.  On average, the 
highest incomes would be earned by those with the highest skill levels, who 
had worked the hardest, and who had been the luckiest.  But there would be 
no way to precisely separate out the effects of each component. 
This observation about randomness is not a new phenomenon.  In tax 
literature, it goes back decades.21  In a provocative new book titled Success 
and Luck, Robert Frank discusses the links between chance and economic 
success and how the effects are magnified immensely in a globalized 
economy characterized by “winner-take-all” or “modified winner-take-all” 
outcomes.22  Frank also notes that the impact of almost trivial advantages 
can be magnified over the course of lifetimes, leading to very different 
outcomes for individuals who seemingly had been very nearly equally 
situated at some point in their lives.  Many recent papers have focused on 
economic mobility and people’s economic prospects based on their parents’ 
economic situations, the area where they live, or whether they were born 
into poverty, and these might be viewed as other dimensions of luck.23 
In designing an optimal income tax system, economists usually trade off 
the efficiency of raising revenue (where inefficiency is measured by the 
distortive effects of a tax system) and the equity outcomes generated by the 
tax system.  Typically, the result is a tax system where the marginal tax 
rates on individuals do not excessively deter those with the greatest skills 
from contributing the most effort to generate income (and also to grow the 
overall size of the economy and contribute to the public good).  And in this 
system, average tax rates tend to grow with income to ensure that most 
 
 21. See Varian, supra note 20, at 49 (noting that randomness in income simply cannot be 
ignored). 
 22. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, SUCCESS AND LUCK: GOOD FORTUNE AND THE MYTH OF 
MERITOCRACY (2016). 
 23. See Raj Chetty et al., Is the United States Still the Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in 
Intergenerational Mobility, 104 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 141, 142, 144-45 (2014); see also 
Debacker et. al., supra note7, at 135, 138-39. 
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taxpayers contribute to the common good in a way consistent with their 
ability to pay taxes.  But when there is no uncertainty involved, the optimal 
tax system will try to have a zero marginal tax rate on the last dollar earned 
by the highest income person (because that will reflect the highest skill level 
in the population) in order to maximize the size of the economic pie 
available to support public goods. 
But when randomness is introduced into this sort of model, a potential 
insurance role for the income tax system emerges, where very high incomes 
are the result of a combination of skills, effort, and good fortune.  Similarly, 
in this type of model, the lowest incomes are an indication of bad luck.  The 
income tax system, acting as an insurance mechanism, would seek to offset 
some of these random effects by progressively taxing higher incomes 
through an increasing marginal tax rate schedule, while simultaneously 
subsidizing lower incomes, perhaps through something like the current law 
earned income tax credit or another form of a work credit or through 
transfer payments. 
In this sort of a model, a progressive income tax system does two 
things: 
(1) It serves an equity role by financing public goods and providing 
for transfer payments or tax credits by assessing relatively higher 
tax burdens on those with the greatest ability to pay, or those with 
the highest incomes; and 
(2) It serves an insurance role by taxing the lucky more than the 
unlucky to pay for public goods and to finance transfers to the less 
fortunate. 
The combination helps to push against income inequality.  These design 
considerations point out the three-dimensional balancing act the income tax 
system accomplishes.  The progressive rate structure will create a labor or 
effort disincentive at the margin, and so marginal rates will not go so high 
as to dissuade large amounts of productive labor effort.  The rate structure 
needs to raise enough revenue to pay for  public goods and insurance 
provided, while meeting the equity goals of society. 
This three-dimensional tradeoff is what policymakers need to evaluate 
in designing tax reform plans.  If income inequality is increasing over time, 
then maybe the insurance component of the income tax system should be 
emphasized more.  The resulting tax rate schedule may be more progressive 
than today’s, though the degree of progressivity should be tempered so that 
marginal income tax rates on those with the highest incomes do not act as a 
major labor disincentive. 
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To broaden the model a little bit, the characterization of luck need not 
be an annual feature.  It could be the case that one’s choice of profession 
and the compensation for being in that profession has a luck component that 
changes over time. 
For example, a journeyman baseball player today earns a salary that 
puts him into the top one percent of earners.  Fifty years ago, the same type 
of journeyman player would have had a salary that placed him quite a bit 
lower in the income distribution, though solidly in the upper-middle class.  
This facet of earnings ability for a baseball player today reflects the good 
fortune of coming of age, during a time of strong demand for these services 
and a relatively strong bargaining position for baseball players. 
This situation stands in contrast to a high school graduate who works at 
a non-union factory, who fifty years ago could aspire to a comfortable 
middle-class existence on the market contributions of one-wage earner.  The 
comparable person today faces a much more difficult earnings situation due 
to coming of age in a very challenging economic environment, an example 
of bad luck in timing. 
A similar approach can underlie the thinking behind the estate tax.  If 
very large estates are generated in part by an ongoing series of lucky 
outcomes, and if these fortuitous outcomes are not subject to tax annually at 
progressive rates, then an argument can be made for an effective estate tax 
to provide some measure of inter-temporal insurance.  A well-thought-out 
estate tax program, coupled with smart investments in early childhood 
learning or development, could help blunt some of the long-term effects of 
random occurrences of good or bad fortune. 
A similar set of factors may also underpin the distribution of business 
incomes in the modern globalized economy.  Traditional models focus on 
the expected after-tax return to capital as the key determinant of investment 
decisions.  If there is a random component to earnings, with a wide 
dispersion and long-lasting effects, then a more sophisticated analysis may 
be needed.  If the big winners in the globalized economy are those 
companies that develop a blockbuster drug, a widely-adopted software 
product, or some other type of disruptive technology that cannot easily be 
copied, then the ultimate return to these investments far exceeds the risk-
adjusted rate of return to capital used in the initial investment decision.  In a 
sense, the best-seller drug is the result of an uncertain Research and 
Development (R&D) process that generates enormous returns, large enough 
to offset the costs of unsuccessful R&D efforts undertaken by the firm. 
It would be quite difficult for the tax system to disentangle the luck 
components from the routine returns on a firm’s investments.  Current 
approaches to corporate taxation generally take the position that the tax 
authority acts as a kind of “silent partner” with the firm.  In this 
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characterization, the relatively flat rate of tax applied to corporate earnings 
applies to the large incomes that occur on the upside (when fortune smiles 
on the firm) and loss offsets of some form are allowed on the downside 
(when firms are unlucky).  This approach makes economic sense if you 
think that the owners of firms can essentially self-insure through the capital 
markets.  In this case, it is unnecessary for the corporate income tax system 
to have a specific insurance component, whether provided through 
progressive tax rates or otherwise. 
This has been a whirlwind tour through three aspects of how luck and 
tax policy interact. The first aspect looked at how the tax policy profession 
gets populated and the role that luck and serendipity play in determining 
career paths.  Obviously, this has implications for non-tax employment as 
well, but I think it serves as a good illustrative case, and one that many of us 
can attest to via introspection (though all of us may not want to undertake 
that exercise). 
The second aspect is the role that luck plays in the successful effort to 
enact real tax reform.  In a sense, the stars have to align favorably for tax 
legislation to be enacted: 
 
 The problem to be addressed must be recognized; 
 Potential solutions must be identified; and 
 Political support for an identified solution must be obtained. 
 
The process can falter at any one of these stages, due to bad timing, 
unbridgeable differences, or just misfortune in the overall legislative 
process.  And when tax reform legislation does get enacted, there is no 
guarantee that these reforms will be durable or recognized as reform in 
future years.  The creation of the AMT stands as a cautionary tale of tax 
reform attempts gone awry. 
In contrast, the 1986 Tax Reform Act stands as a relatively durable 
example of successful reform, even though the subsequent decades have 
seen significant amounts of reform whittled away.  As the coming year 
unfolds, we will see whether the current effort to reform the Tax Code is 
fortunate enough to be viewed as true reform, which improves the workings 
of the Tax Code. 
Finally, the third aspect focused on the situation where luck plays a 
significant role in determining the incomes and wealth of individuals.  In 
these cases, a progressive income tax system can provide a measure of 
income insurance, by essentially taxing more the income of luckier 
individuals and delivering lower taxes, or even transfers, to those who are 
unlucky.  The design goal is to balance the effects of equitable treatment of 
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taxpayers and the provision of income insurance against the efficiency 
aspects of the marginal income tax rates on labor supply decisions and 
capital supply or saving decisions of individuals. 
The same kind of intuition may also apply to the estate tax, where the 
insurance provided through the tax system involves the lifetime effects of 
differential luck or fortuitous events.  If these differential effects build on 
each other over time, then it may be likely that very large estates have a 
large component of luck built into them.  In this case, a well-designed estate 
tax program can function as a valuable social insurance delivery 
mechanism. 
My goal today was to be a bit provocative and to ask you to think about 
common topics from a slightly different perspective than is normally the 
case.  Hopefully, these three topics caused you to reconsider, at least a little 
bit, the role that luck plays in our lives, our legislative processes, and in our 
tax systems. 
Thanks again to the people from the Ohio Northern University Pettit 
College of Law who invited me here today.  And thank you so much for 
your attention this evening. 
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